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As with a stage magician, a vanishing elephant is far more im-
pressive and mysterious than a disappearing coin.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Two thousand five hundred pounds of frozen shrimp mysteri-
ously disappear from a cold storage warehouse.2 The equivalent of
151 tank car loads of soy bean oil vanishes without a trace from
storage tanks.3 Metal bars weighing 845 pounds magically disap-
pear from a warehouse.' Fires, rains, and floods destroy and dam-
age other warehoused goods. Still other warehoused goods are sto-
len by burglars. In all of these loss cases, whether by mysterious or
obvious causes, the bailor and the warehouse are concerned with
the question of who will bear the loss. This article will explore the
question of who bears the loss in the United States under the Uni-
form Commercial Code. Comparisons will then be made with the
solutions presented under the laws of France, Italy, Spain, Argen-
tina, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Honduras, Paraguay, Chile, and
El Salvador.
Section 7-204 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) sets
out the warehouseman's basic duty to exercise reasonable care
commensurate with the circumstances.5 If he does so, he will not
1. Inland Metals Refining Co. v. Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc. 557 F. Supp 344, 348 n.
6, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 266, 271 n. 6 (N.D. II. 1983).
2. Sanfisket, Inc. v. Atlantic Cold Storage Corp., 347 So. 2d 647, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
1155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
3. Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co. v. Lawrence American Field Warehousing Corp.,
16 N.Y.2d 344, 213 N.E.2d 873, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 157 (N.Y. 1965).
4. I.C.C. Metals, Inc. v. Municipal Warehouse Co., Inc., 431 N.Y.S.2d 372, 409 N.E.2d
849, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 217 (N.Y. 1980).
5. U.C.C. § 7-204 (1978): Duty of Care; Contractual Limitation of Warehouseman's
Liability:
(1) A warehouseman is liable for damages for loss of or injury to the goods
caused by his failure to exercise such care in regard to them as a reasonably
careful man would exercise under like circumstances but unless otherwise agreed
he is not liable for damages which could not have been avoided by the exercise
of such care.
(2) Damages may be limited by a term in the warehouse receipt or storage
agreement limiting the amount of liability in case of loss or damage, and setting
forth a specific liability per article or item, or value per unit of weight, beyond
which the warehouseman shall not be liable; provided, however, that such liabil-
ity may on written request of the bailor at the time of signing such storage
agreement or within a reasonable time after receipt of the warehouse receipt be
increased on part or all of the goods thereunder, in which event increased rates
may be charged based on such increased valuation, but that no such increase
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be liable for loss or damage to the goods. This section, in effect,
follows the pre-code rule that a warehouse is not an insurer of the
goods.'
Section 7-204(2) permits the warehouse to limit its liability,
except for conversion of the goods to its own use. This subsection
makes the bailor either a self insurer or places the economic bur-
den upon him to secure an "all risks" insurance policy or some
kind of extended coverage under an existing insurance policy.
7 If
the bailor requests that the coverage liability be increased, then
the warehouseman will most likely demand increased storage
charges in order to cover this additional liability. The bailor, in
either event, pays the costs of insurance whether he is self-insured,
pays for his own insurance or declares a higher value and pays in-
creased storage costs.
At first glance, it may appear unfair for the bailor to pay for
insurance against the warehouse's negligence, but virtually every
transaction which has an "end user" results in the end user paying
for the costs of insurance. For example, part of a patient's fee is
allocated towards his doctor's malpractice policy. Similarly, a por-
tion of the consumer's purchase price of a product is allocated for
products liability insurance.
If the bailor already has adequate insurance coverage, he
would naturally feel reluctant to declare the full value of the bailed
goods and pay a higher charge because he would, in effect, be pay-
ing for double coverage. It has been suggested, however, that the
insured bailor's failure to declare the true value of the goods may
preclude his insurer's right to full subrogation recovery against the
shall be permitted contrary to a lawful limitation of liability contained in the
warehouseman's tariff, if any. No such limitation is effective with respect to the
warehouseman's liability for conversion to his own use.
(3) Reasonable provisions as to the time and manner of presenting claims
and instituting actions based on the bailment may be included in the warehouse
receipt or tariff.
(4) This section does not impair or repeal . . [.]
The Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act did not expressly authorize the use of valuation or
limitation of liability clauses, and the courts were split as to the validity of these clauses
under general contract principles. See George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 33 Cal. 2d 834,
205 P.2d 1037 (Cal. 1949).
6. U.C.C.§§ 7-204, 7-403 (1978).
7. See the general discussion by Professor Honnold relating to the fact that most insur-
ance policies insure the goods in the owner's possession without covering goods located in
the possession of others. J. HONNOLD, TiE LAW OF S..As AND SALEs FINANCING, 167-70 (4th
ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as HONNOLD].
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warehouse.' Further, the bailor's insurer could argue that the
bailor's failure to declare the full value of the goods and the conse-
quent impingement of its insurer's subrogation rights is a defense
to the policy. On the other hand, if the law compels the bailor to
declare the true value and pay a higher rate for insurance coverage,
then there may well be a subrogation windfall for the insurer at
the bailor's expense.
Professor Honnold has raised the question, "Would the failure
of a warehouseman to carry insurance protecting both himself and
the owner constitute a default in the 'reasonable care' standard? If
so, should the net result be simplified by change in the language of
the Code?" Although there is an ambiguity in the question, it ap-
pears that Professor Honnold meant that the warehouse could be
liable for inadequate insurance coverage only in cases where it was
at fault and only up to the declared value of the goods. If the ques-
tion means that the insurance is to protect the owner for the actual
value, then it seems to contradict the liability limitation of section
7-204. Assuming that the former interpretation is correct, how does
one enforce this duty unless the bailor has possession of an insur-
ance certificate which names the bailor as the insured? If the ware-
houseman breaches his duty and does not have adequate insurance
coverage in the event of a major loss, the warehouseman's duty will
be ineffective when that loss results in its bankruptcy.
Section 7-204(1), which defines the warehouseman's duties as
to "loss or injury to the goods," was not meant to encompass a case
of misdelivery of the goods. Section 7-403(1)'O requires the bailee
8. Fireman's Fund American Insurance Co. v. Boston Harbor Marina, Inc., 406 F.2d
917, 921, n.5, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 186, 189, n.5 (1st Cir. 1969).
9. HONNOLD, supra note 7, at page 417.
10. U.C.C. § 7-403 (1978). Obligation of Warehouseman or Carrier to Deliver; Excuse.
(1) The bailee must deliver the goods to a person entitled under the docu-
ment who complies with subsections (2) and (3), unless and to the extent that
the bailee establishes any of the following:
(a) delivery of the goods to a person whose receipt was rightful as
against the claimant;
(b) damage to or delay, loss or destruction of the goods for which the
bailee is not liable, [but the burden of establishing negligence ih such
cases is on the person entitled under the document];
Note: The brackets in (1)(b) indicate that State enactments may dif-
fer on this point without serious damage to the principle of uniformity.
(c) previous sale or other disposition of the goods in lawful enforce-
ment of a lien or on warehouseman's lawful termination of storage;
(d) the exercise by a seller of his right to stop delivery pursuant to
the provisions of the Article on Sales (Section 2-705);
[Vol. 16:3
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to "deliver the goods to a person entitled under the document,"
and subsection (4) states that the person entitled under the docu-
ment means the "holder of a negotiable document, or the person to
whom delivery is to be made by the terms of or pursuant to writ-
ten instructions under a non-negotiable document." Section 7-403,
therefore, governs a misdelivery case, and the warehouseman's care
or lack of care is irrelevant. The warehouse is, in effect, absolutely
liable for misdelivery."1 This U.C.C. misdelivery rule is merely a
codification of the common law rule that a misdelivery, even
though innocently made, was a conversion of the bailor's goods.'
Section 7-204 makes no attempt to articulate who has the bur-
den of proving the exercise or non-exercise of reasonable care by
the warehouse; this problem is dealt with in section 7-403(1). If the
volume of cases is any indication, the burden of proof aspect has
presented the more difficult problem. The case law under section
7-204 has been rather routine. This article, therefore, will first dis-
cuss the burden of proof problems arising under section 7-403(1)
and then deal with the relatively few cases arising under section 7-
204.
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
Section 7-403(1)(b) provides:
The bailee must deliver the goods to a person entitled
(e) a diversion, reconsignment or other disposition pursuant to the
provisions of this Article (Section 7-303) or tariff regulating such right;
(f) release, satisfaction or any other fact affording a personal defense
against the claimant;
(g) any other lawful excuse.
(2) A person claiming goods covered by a document of title must satisfy the
bailee's lien where the bailee so requests or where the bailee is prohibited by law
from delivering the goods until the charges are paid.
(3) Unless the person claiming is one against whom the document confers no
right under Sec. 7-503(1), he must surrender for cancellation or notation of par-
tial deliveries any outstanding negotiable document covering the goods, and the
bailee must cancel the document or conspicuously note the partial delivery
thereon or be liable to any person to whom the document is duly negotiated.
(4) "Person entitled under the document" means holder in the case of a
negotiable document, or the person to whom delivery is to be made by the terms
of or pursuant to written instructions under a non-negotiable document.
11. Turner v. Scobey Moving & Storage Co., 515 S.W.2d 253, 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1122
(Tex. 1974).
12. R.A. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 86 (1936); R.A. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY §
11.7 (3d ed. 1975).
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under the document ... unless and to the extent that the bailee
establishes any of the following:
(a)... ;
(b) damage to or delay, loss or destruction of the goods
for which the bailee is not liable [but the burden of estab-
lishing negligence in such cases is on the person entitled
under the document].
The phrase "burden of establishing" means "the burden of per-
suading the triers of fact that the existence of the fact is more
probable than its non-existence."' Is
The bracketed language in section 7-403 is optional language,
and at the time of the writing of this article, 16 states had adopted
it, or a variation thereof.1 ' California and Texas have limited the
burden of persuasion language to cases involving fire damage or
destruction.15 Indiana has also limited the optional clause to cases
involving fire, but only in those instances where the claimed loss
exceeds $10,000.00,'0 while Idaho has followed this fire damage ap-
proach, but has limited it to warehouses which are not statutorily
licensed. 17
Initially, one might wonder why the burden of establishing
negligence should rest upon bailors in the case of fire loss or dam-
age but not in the case of theft, flood, windstorm, et cetera? Is the
bailor, in a fire circumstance, in a better position to prove negli-
gence than in any other case of loss? Surely the warehouse is in a
better position than the bailor to account for its own behavior or
misbehavior regardless of the nature of the loss. On the other
hand, the police will usually investigate any fire damage to ware-
houses if there is any thought of arson; insurance investigators will
also be involved in all alleged arson cases. Consequently, a bailor
may have evidence which he would not have in other casualty
losses.
Florida has adopted the optional section without restricting it
to fire losses, but has confined it to instances where the loss ex-
ceeds $10,000.00.'8 The Florida provision was promptly attacked
13. U.C.C. § 1-201(8) (1978).
14. U.C.C. § 7-403, 2A U.L.A. 433-34 (1978); see id., at 155 (Supp. 1984).
15. CAL. CoM. CODE § 7-403(1)(b) (West 1984); TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §
7.403(a)(2) (Vernon 1984).
16. IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-7-403(1)(b) (Burns 1984).
17. IDAHO CODE § 28-7-403(1)(b)(1984).
18. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 677.403(1)(b)(West 1984).
[Vol. 16:3
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on equal protection grounds. It was upheld on the basis that in
"mom and pop" bailments of under $10,000.00 the burden of proof
ought to be on the warehouse because of the costs of discovery,
while in bailments over this amount the bailor can afford the dis-
covery costs. 9 The court, in essence, made a rational classification
between bailors.
One court has judicially noted" that, since federal law has
usually placed the burden of persuasion upon the warehouse, the
optional language in section 7-403(1)(b) ("but the burden of estab-
lishing negligence in such cases is on the person entitled under the
document") seems to be at odds with the official comment2 which
states that the "optional language in subsection (1)(b) states the
rule laid down for interstate carriers in many federal cases. State
decisions are in conflict as to both carriers and warehousemen.
Particular states may prefer to adopt the federal rule." This au-
thority suggests that the draftsman may have intended to place
the burden of persuasion upon the warehouse, rather than upon
the person entitled under the document.
Moreover, the two clauses seem internally contradictory: if the
warehouseman "establishes" (proves) that fire caused the loss and
that he was not negligent, he is not liable for any amount - if the
burden is on the holder of the warehouse receipt to "establish"
that the warehouse was negligent, then you have a contradiction in
terms. Both bailor and bailee cannot "prove" their respective
cases. The bailee was or was not negligent, freedom from negli-
gence and negligence cannot be proved at the same time.
I.C.C. Metals, Inc. v. Municipal Warehouse Co., Inc., at-
tempts to reconcile the apparently conflicting provisions of section
7-403 (1)(b) with the optional clause:
Where the warehouse simply refuses to return bailed property
upon a legitimate demand and does not advance any explana-
tion for that refusal, the plaintiff will be entitled to recover
without more. Similarly, where the warehouse does suggest an
explanation for the loss but is unable to proffer sufficient evi-
dentiary support for that explanation to create a question of
fact, as in this case, the plaintiff will be entitled to recover with-
19. Reserve Insurance Co. v. Gulf Florida Terminal Co., 386 So. 2d 550, 551 (Fla. 1980);
see also E.S. Meats, Inc. v. Gulf Florida Terminal Co., 639 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1981).
20. United States v. Cloverleaf Cold Storage, 286 F. Supp. 680, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 881
(N.D. Iowa 1968).
21. Comment 3 to U.C.C. § 7-403 (1978).
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out more. Where, however, the warehouse proffers sufficient evi-
dence supporting its explanation to create a question of fact, the
jury must be instructed that if it believes that explanation, the
plaintiff must be denied any recovery unless he has proven that
the warehouse was at fault (Uniform Commercial Code § 7-403
subd. [1], par. [b]). In other words, if the jury is persuaded that
the goods were accidentally mislaid or destroyed in a fire or acci-
dent or stolen by a third party, the plaintiff cannot recover un-
less he has proven that the loss or the fire or the accident or the
theft were the proximate result of either a purposive act or a
negligent commission or omission by the warehouse.
2
In short, the court is stating that the burden of establishing the
nature of the loss is on the warehouse, but that the burden of es-
tablishing the warehouse's negligence is on the bailor. This ap-
proach is more of a re-writing of the statute than an interpretation
of it.
The burden of proof problem becomes acute when the goods
mysteriously disappear, thus neither the warehouse nor the bailor
has any explanation for the loss except conjecture that the goods
may have been stolen by employees, or by third persons, or were
misdelivered altogether. At least three main views have developed
in response to this problem.
The first view, which is fairly represented in an intermediate
appellate decision from Florida, states that when bailed goods dis-
appear from the warehouse and the warehouseman is unable to of-
fer any explanation for the loss, then this "evidence only permits
the finding of negligence on the part of Atlantic [the warehouse-
man], not a conversion."2 Because of this finding of negligence,
rather than conversion, the warehouseman could plead that he was
liable for only fifty cents per pound for frozen shrimp (totaling
$1,250 for 2,500 pounds of shrimp) rather than $8,000, the market
value of the shrimp.
The warehouseman admitted negligence in this case, which is
not surprising in light of the limitation clause. The court made no
mention of section 7-403(1)(b) but instead confined its discussion
to section 7-204. The court committed egregious error when it
stated that "in order for Sanfisket [the bailor] to prove a conver-
22. 431 N.Y.S.2d 372, 378, 409 N.E.2d 849, 854, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 217, 224 (N.Y.
1980).
23. Sanfisket, Inc. v. Atlantic Cold Storage Corp., 347 So. 2d 647, 649, 21 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 1155, 1157 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
[Vol. 16:3
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sion upon Atlantic's [the warehouseman] failure to deliver the
shrimp upon demand, Sanfisket must show that Atlantic had the
shrimp at the time of the demand and was able to comply there-
with." This statement completely overlooks the fact that a prior
misdelivery by the warehouseman would also constitute a conver-
sion.2 If one follows the view that there is no legal defense of
"negligent misdelivery," then the only possible explanation of the
loss of 2,500 pounds of frozen shrimp is that warehouse employees
stole it or that the warehouse converted it. What the court is really
saying in the case of the disappearance of a large, bulky, and heavy
object is that it will give the warehouseman the benefit of the
doubt. If the benefit of the doubt test is to be used, it ought to be
confined to small, easily transported and hidden objects, not to
over a ton of frozen shrimp.
A lower federal court has opined that:
[Wihere the record is silent as to the actual disposition of the
bailed goods, and that silence includes not even an attempt by
the bailee to offer an explanation, the permissible inference is
one of negligence but not one of conversion, with the result that
the stipulated-for limitation of liability will be held by the
Pennsylvania courts to be effective.2
Similarly, a Kentucky appellate court has held that when over
900 cases of pickles were missing from a warehouse and there was
no explanation as to the cause of the disappearance, the bailor
ought to be granted a judgment based upon negligence as a matter
of law. The court never intimated that the warehouse ought to
have been treated as a convertor.2 7
The second view regarding mysteriously disappearing bailed
goods originated, perhaps accidentally, in Proctor & Gamble Dis-
tributing Co. v. Lawrence American Field Warehousing Corp.8 In
that case approximately 151 tank car loads of soy bean oil disap-
peared after allegedly being deposited in warehouse storage tanks.
The bailor sued in conversion and won. The New York Court of
Appeals affirmed and stated:
24. Id. at 648, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1156.
25. J.J. WHITE & R.S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL ConE, 795 (2d ed. 1980).
26. Adams v. Ryan & Christie Storage, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 409, 414, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
930, 937 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
27. D.H. Overmyer Co., Inc. v. Hirsch Bros. & Co., Inc., 459 S.W.2d 598, 8 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 894 (Ky. 1970).
28. 16 N.Y.2d 344, 213 N.E.2d 873, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 157 (N.Y. 1965).
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The Appellate Division well said that it is self-contradictory for
a warehouseman simultaneously to assert due care and total lack
of knowledge of what happened, and that it would establish an
unwise rule to place a bailee in a better position to be excused if
he knew less about the disappearance of the goods than if he
knew more. 9
While there is a certain appeal to the quoted language, the
court overlooked the fact that a "total lack of knowledge" could
exemplify negligence rather than a conversion. It could show that
the warehouseman's employees cooperated with third parties to
steal the oil. Furthermore, the court's cited authority was not
really supportive of the conversion notion; in every cited case there
was a known theft or fire damage to the goods. Moreover, a reading
of the intermediate decision in this case would show that the ware-
house had not taken reasonable measures to guard the oil. Addi-
tionally, the discussion was more oriented towards the negligence
aspect, rather than conversion. 0 Finally, neither decision discussed
any limitation of liability clauses in the warehouse receipts, so that
the recovery in conversion or for negligent loss could, perhaps,
have been the same. The court did not need to stretch presump-
tions in order to find for the bailor.
Subsequent to Lawrence, a New York court treated it as if it
were a negligence case, rather than a conversion case. In Karmely
v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree S.P.A., an airline, acting as bailee, main-
tained custody of twenty-two rubies pending customs clearance.
The rubies disappeared, and the carrier-warehouse claimed that
they were stolen; it did not offer "one single word of explanation
for the disappearance of plaintiff's rubies beyond a categorical
statement that they were stolen."'" The court stated that in cases
where the defense to the disappearance of bailed goods was theft
"the bailee is required, in order to evade liability, to show that the
loss was caused by occurrences beyond his control, giving proof of
the circumstances of loss and at least prima facie evidence of due
care on his part. '3 2 Naturally, this burden would not be satisfied
when the bailee was unable to show that (1) the key to a storeroom
29. 16 N.Y.2d 344, 360, 213 N.E.2d 873, 881, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 157, 167 (N.Y. 1965).
30. Proctor & Gamble Dist. Co. v. Lawrence American Field Warehousing Corp., 22
A.D.2d 420, 255 N.Y.S.2d 788, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 464 (N.Y. App.Div. 1965).
31. Karmely v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree, S.P.A., 174 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 10, 1975, at 8, col. 4, 18
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 479, 481 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1975).
32. 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 481.
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had not been duplicated, (2) it kept no logs on the inventory in the
storeroom, (3) the records showing the deposit of valuable goods
were in full view of the warehouse's employees, and (4) there were
no signs of any kind of burglary.
Comparing the two cases, it might appear that employee theft
would be a clear inference in the disappearance of twenty-two ru-
bies while that inference may be less clear in the disappearance of
tons of soy bean oil in Lawrence. One employee could easily steal
and fence twenty-two rubies, but how would one or a few employ-
ees steal tons of oil, transport it, store it, and then sell it? One can
conclude that as the goods increase in size and weight, it takes
more than employees' theft and employer negligence - it takes em-
ployer action to accomplish it.
Regardless of the inconsistency between the two cases, the
New York Court of Appeals, in I.C.C. Metals, Inc. v. Municipal
Warehouse Co., Inc., followed the reasoning in Lawrence" and im-
posed conversion liability upon a warehouse which could not offer
any facts supporting a plea of theft. In I.C.C. Metals, Inc., a bailor
deposited three lots of indium (an industrial metal) in a ware-
house; the indium weighed 845 pounds and was worth $100,000,
but the bailor signed a warehouse receipt which acknowledged that
the metal was worth only $50.00. The bailor made demand upon
the warehouse, which acknowledged that it was unable to find the
metal. The bailor sued, and the warehouse answered that the metal
had been stolen through no fault of its own. The lower courts held
that the warehouse was liable for the metal's full value on the basis
that when the warehouse was unable to allege and provide satisfac-
tory evidence of the cause of the loss, a prima facie presumption
arose that the warehouse had converted the metal to its own use.
As a result, the warehouse could not plead the limitation of rem-
edy clause in the warehouse receipt in accordance with section 7-
204(2). The New York Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis that
public policy required that the warehouseman account for his cus-
tody of the goods, and that if he were not legally obligated to do
33. 431 N.Y.S. 2d 372, 409 N.E.2d 849, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 217 (N.Y. 1980). Whatever
one may think about the holding in LC.C. Metals, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has adopted its holding in an admiralty case to cover a stevedore (which the court
treated as a bailee) in whose possession metal bars were lost. Phillip Brothers Metal Corp. v.
S.S. "Rio Iguazu," 658 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1981). Philip Brothers was decided on August 7,
1981. But see Clariol, Inc. v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 79 A.D.2d 297, 436 N.Y.S.2d
279, (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), which stated that the Second Circuit had not yet adopted I.C.C.
Metals; Clariol, however, was decided on February 26, 1981.
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so, this would encourage conversion as well as negligent custody of
the goods. The court further concluded that the warehouseman is
in a much better position than the bailor to show what happened
to the goods. In addition, there was a strong dissent which argued
that the warehouse's failure to explain what happened to the goods
might well support a prima facie case of negligence, but not a con-
version which requires the warehouseman to commit a deliberate
act of wrongdoing. The majority decision, in a footnote, stated that
"[w]e find no merit to defendant's suggestion that the term, con-
version to his own use' as used in section 7-204(2) means some-
thing more than a simple conversion (see Lipman v. Peterson, 223
Kan. 483, 525 P.2d 19). ' '3
In Lipman v. Peterson, the court held "that 'conversion' and
conversion to his own use' are synonymous terms and, accordingly,
the limitation clause is inapplicable." 5 The court, however, noted
that the warehouseman's misdelivery did not result in any profit to
him. It would appear that the misdelivery grew out of a confused
setting resulting from a fire which partially damaged the goods; in
fact, the warehouse manager had authorized the delivery from his
hospital bed. It is submitted that Lipman was wrongly decided be-
cause (1) no authority on point was cited, (2) the court failed to
recognize that the draftsmen must have had some purpose in mind
in adding the words "to his own use" (if the two expressions are
"synonymous" then the draftsmen were guilty of redundancy) and
(3) from a moral, as well as a legal standpoint, a "conversion to his
own use" is greatly different from a "conversion caused by confu-
sion." The law should be much more inclined to punish a willful
wrongdoer than one who makes a human error.
Another case has held that when the bailee admits that the
goods may well have been misdelivered, it cannot plead any limita-
tion of its liability because misdelivery constitutes a conversion. It
seems, however, that the court paid no attention to the total
phrase "conversion to his own use" as used in section 7-204(2).e
On the other hand, a court, in another case involving the unex-
plained loss of a large quantity of metal, refused to sustain a con-
version action. It did so because of prior Indiana case law which, as
34. I.C.C. Metals, Inc. v. Municipal Warehouse Co., Inc., 431 N.Y.S. 2d at 376, 409
N.E.2d at 853, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 221.
35. 575 P.2d 19, 21, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 997, 1001 (Kan. 1978).
36. Joseph H. Reinfeld, Inc. v. Griswold & Bateman Warehouse Co., 189 N.J. Super.
141, 458 A.2d 1341, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 262 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983).
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a matter of law, exonerated the warehouse from liability for con-
version when there was no explanation as to what happened to the
goods, and because the court believed that the phrase "conversion
to his own use" continued the thrust of the former case law. In
order to support a conversion theory there would have to be proof
that the warehouse perpetrated some positive wrongdoing. Once
the bailor proved the bailment and the failure to return, the bur-
den of showing freedom from negligence was on the warehouse. Be-
cause the warehouse failed to show any explanation for the loss,
summary judgment was granted on the basis of negligence.3"
The pre-code rule in Arkansas was that once the bailor proved
the bailment, the request for return of the goods and the bailee's
refusal or inability to do so, then the conversion had been proved
unless the warehouse showed that, without its negligence, the
goods were either destroyed by fire or were lost or stolen. 8 Inas-
much as Arkansas did not adopt the optional clause in Section 7-
403(1)(b), the pre-code view may well continue.
In another recent "mysterious disappearance" case, 486 cases
of bottle carrier cartons containing 85,000 carrier cartons disap-
peared. The bailor sued for breach of contract and the court held
that under the case law once the bailor alleged that the warehouse
breached its contract by failure to return, the burden of proof
shifted to the warehouse to prove a legal excuse for its failure to
return. The court noted, almost as an afterthought, that the ware-
houseman was "free to show that his non-delivery was due to the
destruction, loss, etc. of the goods from a cause for which he is not
liable. See § 400, 7-403(1)(b). Respondent made no such show-
ing."3 The opinion seemed to indicate, from prior case authority,
that if the bailor had sued in negligence, the burden of proof could
be on the bailor. Section 7-403 (1)(b), nonetheless, should have the
effect of doing away with any necessity for the remedy to dictate
the burden of proof.
Fire is one of the major causes of loss or damage to bailed
goods, and, unlike "mysterious disappearance" cases, the nature of
the loss is easily established and the burden of proof issue can be
more easily resolved. The same should hold true in water damage
37. Inland Metals Refinery Co. v. Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc., 557 F. Supp. at 344, 36
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 266.
38. American Express Field Warehousing Corp. v. First National Bank, 346 S.W.2d 518
(Ark. 1961).




In Connecticut the bailee has to show not only that a fire or
theft occurred, but also the circumstances of the fire or theft, in-
cluding what precautions were taken to avoid the loss. The ware-
houseman, in essence, must show the origins of the fire and what
steps were taken to prevent it. If the warehouseman sustains this
burden, then the bailor must prove negligence.4
0
A similar view is in effect in New York. The bailor must show
delivery of goods to the bailee and a failure of the bailee to return
them on demand; this is sufficient to make a prima facie case of
negligence. The ultimate burden of persuasion does not shift from
the bailee to the bailor under this rule; rather the bailee can rebut
the prima facie case by showing that the loss was not caused by its
negligence or that proper care of the goods had been taken and
that the loss could not have occurred as a result of its negligence.
Therefore, a plaintiff's showing that the warehouse's sprinkler sys-
tem was inoperative, that the fire alarm was manually activated
rather than automatic in the event of fire, that there was no night
watchman, that the fire department would have arrived sooner if
there had been an automatic fire alarm, could all have been suffi-
cient, if presented to the jury, to prove negligence. 1
In North Dakota there is a presumption of negligence against
a warehouseman when it is shown that the goods were bailed in
good order and were either not re-delivered or were re-delivered in
a damaged condition, except in the case of perishable goods which
deteriorated "in the course of time from inherent or natural condi-
tions. ' 42 In this latter case, the bailor must show that the negligent
acts or omissions of the warehouse and not the inherent or natural
condition of the goods caused the damage to the perishable goods.
Under Tennessee law, the bailor has the burden of proving
that he deposited goods in satisfactory order, that the goods were
or were not returned in damaged condition, and that some defect
in the goods did not cause the loss. The bailee then has the burden
of proving that he did not cause the loss.," Note that this Tennes-
40. Griffin v. Nationwide Moving & Storage Co., Inc., 187 Conn. 405, 446 A.2d 799, 34
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 970 (Conn. 1982).
41. Singer Co. v. Stott & Davis Motor Express, Inc., 79 A.D.2d 277, 436 N.Y.S.2d 508,
31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 658 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); accord J. Aron and Co., Inc. v. Service
Transportation Co., 486 F. Supp. 1070, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 165 (D. Md. 1980).
42. F.M. Potatoes, Inc. v. Suda, 259 N.W.2d 487, 491 (N.D. 1977).
43. Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd. v. Dunbar Transfer & Storage Co., Inc., 732 F.2d 55, 38
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see view is predicated upon another statute" and not upon section
7-403(1)(b) (without the optional clause), which Tennessee has also
adopted.
In Colorado, when bailed goods are re-delivered in a water-
damaged condition a "presumption of negligence on the part of the
warehouseman arises, and the burden of going forward with the
evidence to rebut the presumption [of negligence] rests on the
warehouseman. There is, however, no shift in the burden of proof,
which still remains with the plaintiff. '45 This result seems inconsis-
tent with the "establishing" rule of section 7-403(1)(b).
Prior to the adoption of the U.C.C., the rule in a number of
states was that if the bailor sued in tort for loss or damage to ware-
housed goods, he would have the duty to allege and prove the
warehouseman's negligence. If, however, the bailor sued for breach
of contract, then it would be incumbent upon the warehouseman
to prove proper diligence in the custody of the goods.4' At least one
court has held that the adoption of the U.C.C. did not change this
rule;4  however, a number of courts have held that section 7-403 (1)
(b) now controls and the form of action (tort or contract) should
not affect the burden of proof aspect.48
A. Proper Phrasing and Placement of the Limitation
Clause
Section 7-204(2) states that the limitation may be stated by
"setting forth a specific liability per article or item, or value per
unit of weight.... ." One court has held that the quoted words were
complied with when the receipt stated that the limitation was ".60
per pound, per article."4 The bailor contended that this clause
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 312 (6th Cir. 1984).
44. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-5-111 (1984).
45. Keefe v. Bekins Van & Storage, Co., 540 P.2d 1132, 1133, 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1286,
1287 (Colo. App. 1975).
46. See generally, R.A. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 87 (1955).
47. A.A.A. Parking, Inc. v. Bigger, 113 Ga. App. 578, 149 S.E.2d 255, 3 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 618 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966).
48. Otto Gerdau Co. v. Lambert's Point Docks, Inc., 733 F.2d 343, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
565 (4th Cir. 1984), and infra notes 68-69.
49. Dunfee v. Blue Rock Van & Storage, Inc., 266 A.2d 187, 188, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
1344, 1346 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970). A liability provision in a warehouse receipt which limited
liability to "100 times the base/monthly storage rate" sufficiently complied with the wording
of Section 7-204 that the receipt must recite " a specific liability per article on the item, or a
value per unit of weight" because the storage charges were based on each item at separate
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limited her rights "by weight and by article, rather than by weight
or article." 50 The court stated that it could not "read the statute to
intend that a monetary limitation must be based upon either item
or weight, without any possibility of using both, even though cir-
cumstances might so require."51 The court found that the limita-
tion was clearly stated, and that the bailor understood its meaning.
The bailor's arranging for outside insurance coverage indicated
that she knew the meaning of the limitation clause.
This view should be contrasted with the decision in Modelia,
Inc. v. Rose Warehouse, Inc. 52 where the bailor made three sepa-
rate deposits: the first for 69 cartons, the second for 180 cartons,
and the third for 2 cartons. The warehouse gave back warehouse
receipts which were identical as to terms and conditions: "each
warehouse receipt provided in part that the liability of the ware-
house should be limited to the sum of $50 for all property desig-
nated in each receipt . . . ."' The court held that this limitation
clause was invalid because it did not follow the language of section
7-204 which states that the warehouse receipt must set "forth a
specific liability per article or item, or value per unit of weight
... P)5 It is surprising that the warehouseman, or at least the
lawyer who drafted the form, did not perceive the patent invalidity
of paying damages of $50.00 for 2 cartons and paying the same
sum for 180 cartons.
Section 7-204(2) of the U.C.C. requires that the agreement
limiting the warehouse liability appear on "the warehouse receipt
or storage agreement . . . ." A limitation of liability statement on
an insurance certificate will not satisfy this requirement."
rates of storage. Sun Valley, Inc. v. Southland Bonded Warehouse, Inc., 171 Ga. App. 233,
319 S.E.2d 91, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 984, 985 (1984).
50. Id. at 189, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1347.
•51. Id.




55. Levy v. Narrod Moving Services, Inc., 120 M. App.3d 528, 458 N.E.2d 189, 38
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 307 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983). This same court (different judges) without citing
section 7-204 (2) of the U.C.C., has held that when a warehouse receipt recited the value of
a mink coat to be $300 and the liabilty of the warehouse was limited to $100 (even though
the warehouse allegedly appraised the coat as being worth $4,296.00), then the limit of
liabilty was $300 which would be binding upon the bailor and her subrogating insurance




The current but limited case law is in accord; the limitation of
liability clause need not be printed in conspicuous type, nor must
it be printed on the face of the warehouse receipt or storage docu-
ment. 6 Wisconsin, however, adopted a contrary legislative view in-
serting the word "conspicuous" before the word "term" in section
7-204 (2) with the result that the limitation clause must be in con-
spicuous terms.
5 7
B. Must the Limitation Clause be Bargained For?
Section 7-204(2) requires the limitation clause to be stated on
the warehouse receipt or storage agreement; there is no express re-
quirement that the limitation clause be bargained for or even
drawn to the bailor's attention. Consequently, one court has held
that under section 7-204 the warehouseman is not bound by any
duty to inform the bailor that he can pay an increased storage
charge for his goods and thereby secure greater protection for
them; rather the bailor has to make a written request for such
coverage.5 8
Additionally, some courts hold that there is no duty for the
warehouseman to call the bailor's attention to the limitation of lia-
bility language in the warehouse receipt.5 Conversely, professional
warehousemen in Connecticut, when dealing with a layman, have
"the burden of proving actual knowledge on the part of the plain-
tiff (bailor) or a justifiable belief on his part that she had such
knowledge in order to be exculpated under the limitation of liabil-
ity clauses in the documents involved in this case."'
56. Strom International, Ltd. v. Spar Warehouse & Distributors, Inc., 69 Ill. App. 3d
696, 388 N.E.2d 108, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 233 (Ill. App.. Ct. 1979); Sanfisket, Inc. v. Atlantic
Cold Storage Corp., 347 So. 2d 647, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
57. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 407.204 (West 1984).
58. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Zackinizing Corp., 162 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 10, 1969, at 2,
col. 4T, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1086 (N.Y. App. Term 1969).
59. Keefe v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 36 Colo. App. 382, 540 P.2d 1132, 17 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 1286 (Colo. App. 1975); Dunfee v. Blue Rock Van & Storage, Inc., 266 A.2d 187, 7
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1344 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970); World Products, Inc. v. Central Freight Ser-
vice, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 849, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 675 (D.N.J. 1963), aff'd, 342 F.2d 290, 2
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 716 (3d Cir. 1965).
60. Griffin v. Nationwide Moving & Storage Co., Inc., 187 Conn. 405, 446 A.2d 799, 34
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 970, (Conn. 1982). Accord Carter v. Reichlin Furriers, 34 Conn. Supp. 661,
386 A.2d 647, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 133 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977).
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C. Time Limitations for Complaints and Suit
Section 7-204(3) permits the parties to agree on "[rleasonable
provisions as to the time and manner of presenting claims and in-
stituting actions based on the bailment. . . ." As a consequence, it
is relatively common for warehouse receipts to require the bailor to
make written claims as well as to bring suit within a short period
after loss or damage. It has been held in New York that in the
event that the warehouse is unable to prove the cause of the disap-
pearance of bailed goods and merely advances the speculation that
the warehouse employees stole them, conversion by the bailee is
then presumed and it cannot use the time limitation as a defense."
Section 7-204(2) provides that liability limitation clauses will be
ineffective when the warehouseman converts the goods to his own
use; nothing in this section compels the holding that a time limita-
tion clause is equally ineffective. Implicit in this holding is the no-
tion that in cases of conversion or presumed conversion there has
been a fundamental breach of contract which sets the contract
aside as any kind of protection for the warehouse.
D. Exculpatory Clauses
Although section 7-204 authorizes limitation of liability
clauses, clauses which totally exculpate the warehouse from liabil-
ity are invalid." Similarly, if a warehouseman gives a rate schedule
agreement to a bailor which provides that the warehouseman shall
not be liable for any loss of goods which the bailor has insured
under an extended coverage all risk insurance policy, this provision
is void as an attempt to exculpate the warehouseman from his duty
of care under section 7-202(3).s This warehouseman or more prop-
erly his lawyer, in essence, was trying to use the old "benefit of
insurance" trick under which maritime bills of lading would pro-
vide that the ship would have the benefit of any insurance carried
by the shipper of the goods. The benefit of insurance clause would
then deprive the shipper's insurance company of any subrogation
61. Continental Metals Corp. v. Municipal Warehouse Co., Inc., 112 Misc.2d 923, 447
N.Y.S.2d 849, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 660 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982), aff'd, 459 N.Y.S.2d 406, 35
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
62. Hayat v. MZ Enterprises, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 172 (D.N.J. 1979); Fireman's Fund
American Insurance Co. v. Capt. Fowler's Marina, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 347, 11 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 180 (D. Mass 1971).
63. Kimberly-Clark Corp., v. Lake Erie Warehouse, 49 A.D.2d 492, 375 N.Y.S.2d 918,
18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 476 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
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rights against the maritime carrier. 4 The Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act has expressly invalidated these clauses in foreign maritime
cargo transportation. Unless there is some statutory authority
which directly or indirectly invalidates these benefit of insurance
clauses, it would appear that they are valid.6 These clauses can be
circumvented, nonetheless, by use of the "loan receipt" approach.6
E. Extending Section 7-403 (1) (b) to Other Bailees
Nebraska has not only adopted the optional section, but has
judicially extended its coverage to include other bailees for hire
such as a car dealer to whom the owner had entrusted his car for
warranty repair work. The court noted that the burden upon the
bailee to prove by a preponderance of evidence that he exercised
due care to prevent the loss (by theft) applies whether the suit be
brought in contract or in tort.6 Likewise, Massachussetts has ex-
tended section 7-403 to an upholsterer with whom the bailor had
entrusted his furniture. The court, in addition to its use of section
7-403, conducted an extensive analysis of its prior case law and
concluded that:
[OInce the bailor proves delivery of the property to the bailee in
good condition and the failure to redeliver upon timely demand,
the burden of proof is irrevocably fixed upon the bailee to prove
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he has exercised
due care to prevent the property's loss or destruction. Our hold-
ing extends to all bailment for hire cases, whether brought in
tort or contract, in which the bailee has exclusive control over
the property at the time it was destroyed or damaged.69
One court in Idaho has also used section 7-403 to hold that an
automobile repair garage had the burden of proving freedom from
negligence when a transmission was stolen from a car that was be-
ing repaired. The court noted that when Idaho adopted section 7-
403 it did not adopt the optional language, and that this was a
clear indication that, as a matter of policy, "the burden of estab-
64. G. GILMORE & C.L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, 189-91 (Foundation Press 2d
ed. 1975).
65. 49 STAT. 1207, 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1984).
66. 16 G.J. COUCH, CoucH ON INSURANCE §§ 61:175-61:183 (2d ed. 1983).
67. Id. at § 61:182.
68. Knight v. H.H. Chevrolet, 215 Neb. 166, 337 N.W.2d 742, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1315
(Neb. 1983).
69. Knowles v. Gilchrist Co., 362 Mass. 642, 289 N.E.2d 879 (Mass. 1972).
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lishing negligence should not be placed on the bailor."'
F. Findings and Non-Findings of Negligence
Negligence of the warehouseman can be found from only a few
facts. For example, in a boat marina case (which the court treated
as a warehouse) the court found negligence from the fact that the
marina did not employ a night watchman, and that it did not have
a source of water for the firefighters to use. The lack of water
caused a thirty second delay because the firemen had to dig a fire
hydrant out from under the snow and lay 500 feet of hose. The
bailor proved that the delay caused the damage to its yacht from a
fire which had originated on an adjoining yacht."
Although a hurricane is an act of God, a warehouse may be
liable for flood damage caused by the combination of moon tide
and storm surge when the facts show that the warehouse was negli-
gent for failing to take sufficient precautions in light of all of the
circumstances. Such precautions could include removing the goods
from the warehouse altogether or putting them on the second floor
rather than on the first.7
In a most unusual warehouse case, a warehouseman who ap-
proved the actions of an architect in redesigning a roof construc-
tion plan was held entitled to rely upon the skill of the architect,
and was not liable for damage to bailed goods caused by the col-
lapse of the roof. In the absence of any proof that the warehouse-
man knew of the defects in the changed plans, or should have
known of the defects, there would not even be a jury question as to
negligences.7
In Citizens Bank of Trust Co. v. SLT Warehouse Co.,7 4 the
court was confronted with the question of reasonable care when a
bank, which had lent upon the security of non-negotiable ware-
70. Low v. Park Price Co., 95 Idaho 91, 503 P.2d 291 (Idaho 1972).
71. Fireman's Fund American Insurance Co. v. Capt. Fowler's Marina, Inc., 343 F.
Supp. at 347, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 180 (D. Mass. 1971), e. Fireman's Fund American
Insurance Co. v. Boston Harbor Marina, Inc., 406 F.2d 917, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 186 (lst Cir.
1969) (determination of whether the U.C.C. or marine law governs covered storage of a
yacht).
72. World Products, Inc. v. Central Freight Service, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 849, 2 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 675 (D.N.J. 1963), aff'd, 342 F.2d 290, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 716 (3d Cir. 1965).
73. S.S. Kresge v. Port of Longview, 18 Wash. App. 805, 573 P.2d 1336, 23 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 431 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977).
74. 368 F. Supp. 1042, 1044, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 472, 475 (M.D. Ga. 1974).
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house receipts, sued the warehouse after a bailor surreptitiously re-
moved his own grain from the elevator. In the course of finding
that the warehouse was not liable, the court, in a non-jury trial,
stated:
The evidence makes it clear that the shortages in grain occurred
as a result of the fact that Mathis, through a variety of means,
took the grain from the warehouse controlled by SLT totally
without SLT's knowledge or authority and in a way which was
wrongful as to SLT. He did this by bypassing the SLT locks
which had been placed on the bin doors by removing the hinges
from the doors and loading grain onto trucks by means of a
portable auger inserted into the bins and by bypassing the SLT
lock which had been placed on the electrical switch which con-
trolled the grain elevator by "hot-wiring" the electrical wires
near the switch so that another switch which was supposed to
control the operation of another piece of machinery actually
controlled the operation of the elevator. These means all circum-
vented SLT's control and security over the grain. The court
finds as a matter of fact that the shortages were not due to any
negligence on the part of SLT, its representatives having taken
all precautions which a reasonably prudent warehouseman
would have taken in the circumstance.
5
Query if it is reasonable care to have hinges on a grain elevator
which may be removed and replaced from the outside without no-
tice to the warehousemen? The facts indicated that there had been
more than one withdrawal of grain by this method. Further, is it
reasonable care for the warehousemen to be unaware of the use of
"portable augers?" And lastly, is it reasonable care for the ware-
housemen to fail to take precautions for any kind of a security ser-
vice at night? The court was too kind to the warehouseman.
G. Damages
Although a bailee will not be liable for damage to bailed prop-
erty which was caused by the negligence of a third party, the bailee
may well be liable for the market value of the goods on the date of
the loss if the bailee is unable or unwilling to return the damaged
goods and if no one could determine the salvage value. The bailee,
in effect, is punished because of its failure to return the damaged




Courts are reluctant to award loss of profits as an element of
damages for loss or damage to bailed goods. For profits "to be in-
cluded as a loss item in a bailment contract, the bailee must have
been fully appraised of the fact that the items were for resale and
that the goods could not otherwise be procured in the market. Fur-




The Italian Civil Code, which combines both civil and com-
mercial law,78 articulates the general liability of warehousemen:
Warehouses are responsible for preservation of the goods depos-
ited, unless it is proved that the loss, shrinkage or deterioration
of the goods was due to an unavoidable accident, to the nature
of the goods, or to defects in the nature of their packing.79
Under article 1218 the warehousemen has the burden of prov-
ing the existence of these exonerating events.80 The Italian ware-
houseman is obligated to deliver, upon request of the bailor, a
warehouse receipt which states inter alia "whether or not they [the
goods] have been insured." 8'
The phrasing of the code which states that the warehouseman
is not liable for damage in the event that it was caused by "the
nature of the goods, or to defects in the goods or their packing"
76. C.W.B. Enterprises v. K.A.T. Equipment, 449 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
77. Indemnity Marine Assurance Co. v. Lipin Robinson Warehouse Corp., 99 Mich.
App. 6, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 658, 297 N.W. 846 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
78. M. CAPELLEmrI, J.H. MERRYMAN & J.M. PERILLO, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYsTEM 226
(1967).
79. CODICE CIVILE, art. 1787 (Italy). English, translation taken from M. BELTRAMA, G.
LONGO & J. MERRYMAN, THE ITALIAN CIVIL CODE 445 (1969). The cited text interprets the
Italian phrase "caso fortuito" as "fortuitous event" which is the literal translation. The au-
thor of this article has subtituted the phrase "unavoidable accident" as the peculiar legal
meaning of "fortuitous event."
80. Id., art. 1218. Translation at 322: "1218. Liability of debtor. The debtor [in the
sense of the Obligee] who does not exactly render due performance is liable for damages
unless he proves that the nonperformance or delay was due to impossibility of performance
for a cause not imputable to him."
81. Id., art. 1790(4). Translation at 446.
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does not find any parallels in either section 7-204 or section 7-309
of the U.C.C. (the latter section deals with the common carrier's
duty of care in the United States). Conversely, the Uniform Bills
of Lading used by rail carriers in the United States provide for the
non-liability of the carrier for loss resulting from "a defect or vice
in the property." In addition, the reference to "shrinkage" in the
Italian Code parallels the Uniform Bills of Lading language that
the carrier shall not be liable for "natural shrinkage" of the
goods.82 Similarly, the maritime carrier under the Carriage of Good
Sea Act "is not liable for wastage in bulk or weight or any other
loss or damage arising from inherent defect, quality, or vice of the
goods" or "insufficiency of packing." '
The Italian concept of putting legal responsibility upon the
warehouseman for loss incurred to goods in the possession of the
warehouseman indicates a reflection of the Italian policy that re-
sponsibility lies with the person in possession or control. For exam-
ple, parents, guardians, teachers, and masters of apprentices are
liable for the unlawful acts of minors under their control unless
"they prove that they were unable to prevent the act."'" Similarly,
masters and employers are liable for their servants and employees
unlawful acts during the exercise of the functions to which they are
assigned;85 possessors of personal property are liable for injuries
caused by items in their custody, unless the possessor "proves that
the injuries were the result of an unavoidable accident;"" posses-
sors of animals are similarly liable.8 7 These Italian provisions im-
posing liability upon the person in possession of goods or property
or in control of third persons are paralled in the French Civil
Code. 8
This concept of "unavoidable accident" or caso fortuito de-
serves further discussion. In the French Civil Code the words force
majeure and cas fortuit appear commonly together, and, at times,
they appear separately. When the terms appear together, they are
82. See sample bill of lading in J. HONNOLD, LAW OF SALES AND SALES FINANCING 193
(5th ed. 1984).
83. 49 STAT. 1207, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300, 1304 (2)(m)(n).
84. C.c., art. 2048.
85. Id., art. 2049.
86. Id., art. 2051.
87. Id., art. 2052.
88. CODE CIVIL, arts. 1384, 1386 (France); see J.H. CRAss, THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE, 253-




commonly separated by the disjunctive "or" which would seem to
indicate that they have different meanings. Some French writers
assert that force majeure means basically an act of nature (storms,
earthquakes, et cetera) while cas fortuit or "unavoidable accident"
would encompass acts of humans, such as confiscation by foreign
governments, civil war, acts of war and the like.8e Still other writ-
ers assert that the case law has treated the terms as interchangea-
ble.90 The Italian law seems even clearer that the terms are synon-
ymous. In fact, in the Italian Civil Code the term forza maggiore is
not referred to at all in the law of obligations (contract), but only
in the law dealing with the registration of the marriage ceremony, 91
the presentment and protest of bank checks, and the present-
ment and protest of bills of exchange." In the latter two articles
the term forza maggiore is subsumed under the term ostacolo in-
sormontabile or "insurmountable obstacle" in English.
It would appear that both forza maggiore and caso fortuito
have been subsumed into the concept of impossiblity, which is de-
rived from a "cause not imputable to him" (causa a lui non im-
putabile).' For instance, an Italian text, in its index under forza
maggiore, refers to the preceding text which does not mention
forza maggiore but only the non-imputable clause.9" Looking at
the two sections of the Code regarding obligations, it becomes rela-
tively clear that the term "impossibility" (which is one aspect of
forza maggiore) has been combined with the "imputable" idea:
Liability of a debtor. The debtor who does not exactly render
due performance is.liable for damages unless he proves that the
non-performance or delay was due to impossibility of perform-
ance for a cause not imputable to him. 6
Definitive impossibility and temporary impossibility. An obliga-
89. E.g. 1 C. AuaRY & C. RAU, CrvEL LAW TRANSLATIONS, Daorr Civi. FRANCAIS 107, n.
32b (6 ed. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Trans. 1965).
90. Sm M. Amos & F. WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 186 (F.H. Lawson, A.E.
Anton & L.N. Brown 3d ed 1967); B. NICHOLAS, FRENCH LAW OF CoNTRAcT 196 (1982); 2 K.
ZWEIGERT & H. KoTz, AN INTRODUCTION TO COmPARATIVE LAW 171 (1977); A. VON MEHREN,
THE Ctv LAW SYSTEM 706 (1957).
91. C.c. art. 132 (Italy). Text taken from PL. FRANCHI, V. FEROCI & S. FERRARI, CODICE
Crvi 30 (1966) [hereinafter FRANCHI].
92. Id., art. 53, at 557.
93. Id., art. 61, at 725.
94. Id., art. 1218, at 196.
95. FRANCHI, Indice Analitico-Alfabetico 47.
96. C.c., supra note 79, art. 1218 at 322.
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tion is extinguished when its performance becomes impossible
for a cause not imputable to the debtor.
If the impossibility is only temporary the debtor is not liable for
delay in performance as long as it continues to exist. However,
the obligation is extinguished if the impossibility continues un-
til, depending on the source of the obligation or the nature of its
subject matter, the debtor can no longer be held bound to per-
form the obligation or the creditor is no longer interested in the
performance."
B. France
The French Civil Code presents the bailee's duties in a fashion
which greatly resembles the common law rules of the United
States. The Code, in relevant part, provides:
The bailee must observe, in the keeping of the thing bailed, the
same care that he observes in the keeping of things which belong
to him. 8
The provision of the preceding article is to be applied with
greater strictness:
1. If the bailee himself offered to receive the bailment;
2. If pay was stipulated for the keeping of the
bailment;
3. If the bailment was made only in the interests of the
bailee;
4. If it was agreed expressly that the bailee would an-
swer for any kind of fault."
A comparison of the United States common law rules gov-
erning the duties of the gratuitous bailee, the bailment for mutual
benefit and the bailment for the bailee's sole benefit with the
above French rules provides a striking similarity in approaches.'
The Code goes on to state:
The bailee is not responsible, in any case, for accidents from
97. Id., art. 1256, at 329.
98. C. civ., supra note 88, art. 1927.
99. Id., art. 1928.
100. R.A. BROWN, BROWN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 80-83 (1936); RA. BROWN, BROWN
ON PERSONAL PROPERTY 252-69 (W.R. Raushenbush 3d ed. 1975).
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overpowering force (force majeure) unless he had been put on
notice [that he would be compelled] to restore the thing
bailed.01
In the case where the bailee has lost possession of the bailed
good "through an overpowering force, and who received a price or
something in its place, [the bailee] must restore what he received
in exchange. '10 2 In the event that the bailee is able to return the
item, he is required to do so "only in the state in which it is found
at the time of restitution. Deteriorations which did not happen
through his fault are charged to the bailor."1 3
Although the above rules may be considered sufficient, the
French government deemed it necessary to adopt the Ordinance of
6 August 1945, Relative to General Warehouses to govern commer-
cial warehouses.1 0 4 Article 5 of this Ordinance states that "[any
person who delivers merchandise in deposit with a general ware-
house is required to declare the nature and value to the operator
[of the warehouse]."
In response to this duty of the bailor, the law then provides
for a reciprocal duty of the warehouseman:
The operators of general warehouses are responsible, within the
limits of the value declared, for the safekeeping and the conser-
vation of the deposits which are entrusted to them.
They are not responsible for damages and losses naturally aris-
ing from the nature and condition of the merchandise or the
case of force majeure.05
This same ordinance also provides for obligatory insurance:
Merchandise susceptible to warehouse receipts is obligatorily in-
sured against fire by the general policy of the warehouse.
Nevertheless, for the operators of general warehouses estab-
lished in the maritime ports, this obligation is suspended with
regard to stored merchandise covered by maritime assurance so
that this assurance guarantees these risks.
101. C. civ., supra note 88, art. 1929 at 351. The bracketed language has been added to
the text for the sake of clarity.
102. Id., art. 1934.
103. Id., art. 1933.
104. DALLOZ, CODES ET Lois USUELS 509-11 (36th ed. 1975) (Text translated by author).
105. ORDINANCE OF 6 AuousT 1945, RELATivE TO GENERAL WAREHOUSES, art. 6.
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If pendent this period, a disaster occurs, the responsibility of the
operator of the general warehouse shall not come bound face to
face with the depositors, of the company of assurance and of the
holders of the warehouse receipts. At the expiration of said pe-
riod, the merchandise above mentioned to be assured under the
general policies of the warehouse.'01
The concept of force majeure is sometimes translated as being
the same as an act of God. This translation is incorrect, however,
because force majeure includes acts by third parties which are be-
yond the control of the person (in this case, the warehouseman)
who is asserting the defense as an excuse for the non-return of the
bailed goods. Force majeure, in a sense, is a broader defense than
an act of God-an unforeseeable terrorist attack on a warehouse
could well be encompassed under force majeure, but it would not
be an act of God. One authority has declared that force majeure
exists when the "the court is satisfied that it has become impossi-
ble to perform the contract by reason of a supervening event which
could not have been reasonably foreseen by the parties."1 °
Another authority has succinctly defined the notion as pos-
sessing the following characteristics:
(1) irresistibilite - the event must render performance of his ob-
ligation impossible, and not merely more onerous; (2) im-
previsibilite - the event must not be reasonably foreseeable, for
he ought then to have taken steps to prevent or avoid it; (3)
exteriorite - the event must proceed from some external cause,
i.e. not from a cause within his sphere of responsibility such as
vice in the goods themselves.'08
It has been noted that the concepts of impossibility and un-
foreseeability "are to be understood in a reasonable sense and in
light of the circumstances. It is a question of appreciation.' ' 10 9 A
much more rigid view of force majeure has been expressed by an-
other authority:
According to the doctrine of force majeure a contract will be
rescinded in French law, and no liability will be incurred by a
party to it for the nonperformance by such party of his obliga-
tions under the contract, if the courts are satisfied that it has
106. Id., art. 12.
107. M. AMos & F. WALTON, supra note 90, at 165.
108. BENJAMIN, BENJAMIN'S SALE OF GOODS § 662 (1974).
109. M. AMos & F. WALTON, supra note 90, at 186.
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become impossible to perform the contract, by reason of an
event which could not have been reasonably foreseen by the par-
ties at the time when the contract was entered into. Perform-
ance of the contract must be absolutely impossible, and must
not merely be more onerous for a party in order to constitute
force majeure.110
The same authority states further:
The sole fact of a war or a strike or a riot or plundering, for
instance, has constantly been held not to be ipso facto a case of
force majeure; the special circumstances of the case must always
be investigated in order to determine whether such events could
not have been reasonably foreseen by the parties and whether
they have given rise to an absolute impossibility to perform the
contract."1
If you take the example of the warehouseman's liability for
burglary, a comparision of the reasonable standard under the "or-
dinary care" test of the United States with the force majeure test
of Europe should produce obvious differences. If the burglary oc-
curs in the United States, the warehouseman will not be liable if it
is shown that he used reasonable, ordinary care commensurate
with the circumstances. However, this "ordinary care commensu-
rate with the circumstances" standard may indicate that a high de-
gree of care to prevent burglary might be required in a high crime
area, and a lesser degree of care in an area relatively free of crime.
Using the force majeure concept, burglary is always foreseeable in
a real world, thus the warehouseman would have to show that he
took all steps to avoid the occurrence, not just reasonable ones.
This analysis in the application of the force majeure concept
to the warehouseman regarding the degree of care can be sup-
ported by two German professors' views of the French notion of
force majeure:
The critical question therefore is in what cases the courts are
ready to treat an obstacle to performance as "force majeure" or
"cas fortuit" and so to free the debtor from his obligation to pay
damages. The writers say that an obstacle to performance only
serves as a defense if it is an "obstacle imprevisible et irresisti-
ble" which renders it "absolument impossible" for the debtor to
110. David, Frustration of Contract in French Law, 28 J. COMP. LEGS. & INT'L L. 11
(1946).
111. Id. at 12.
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perform (see PLANIOL/RIPERT VII no. 838). Although the
courts tend to stress one of these criteria at the expense of the
others, it is certain that an obstacle to performance will not
serve as a defense if the debtor had even the slightest chance of
avoiding it and neglected to avail himself of it. Even the very
great difficulties in procuring, transporting or delivering goods
which occur in wartime do not free the vendor.
113
The same authors have articulated the standard of care for a
person having custody of goods relative to occurrences which could
be described as acts of God:
Natural events are only regarded as force majeure if they occur
with unforeseeable suddenness and irresistible violence and the
custodian in the case could not possibly or reasonably have
taken the steps required to prevent the harm (see MAZEAUD/
TUNE II no. 16007f., citing many decisions). In such a case the
custodian is freed from liability entirely, but if some fault of the
custodian concurred with the event which constitutes force
majeure, a recent line of decisions allows the custodian to be
held liable for just part harm (Com. 19 June 1951, S. 1952 1.
89).113
Professor Mazeaud and Tunc who are cited above, state:
Natural phenomenons do not present the nature of force
majeure unless they are such, by their unexpectedness or their
violence, that there is no way that you can reproach the keeper
for not having taken the necessary measures to impede its harm-
ful consequences or in the hypothesis in which the resistance of
the thing reveals that it had been diminished by a hidden defect
[when in fact] that the damage seems to have been caused by a
natural phenomenon more than by that defect (1 bis). That has
been judged in several cases by the wind (2) by the rain (2 bis)
by a "false rising" of the water which is produced during tides
114
The French authors, in support of this statement, cite an old
French case which states that the "wind and tempests do not con-
stitute force majeure unless they are invested with a nature of ex-
ceptional violence and if they may not be avoided."1 1 The authors
112. 2 K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1977).
113. Id. at 327.
114. H. MAZEAUD. L MAZEAUD & A. TUNC, TRAITE THEORIQUE ElT PRATIQUE DE LA




cite another case which held that if the tempest was the principal
but not the sole cause, the court would reduce the liability of the
custodian by four-fifths of the good's value."1 Incidentally, the
court found some fault on the part of the custodian.
Under the French ordinance discussed above, a warehouseman
must have fire insurance. This requirement alleviates many of the
common problems which arise when bailed goods are destroyed by
fire. It is surprising, however, that the ordinance does not also re-
quire insurance for other casualties such as floods, thefts and
windstorms.
C. Spain
The Spanish law which governs general warehouses does not
articulate any standard of care for the warehouseman,"" but rather
it states that general warehousemen are governed first by the law
of general warehouses and second by the Commercial Code." 8 The
Commercial Code, in its treatment of "mercantile deposits," states
that the depository:
is obliged to conserve the object of the deposit according to the
receipt, and to return it with its increases (aumentos) if it has
them, when the depositor requests it.
[I]n the conservation of the deposit the depository shall respond
for the deteriorations, damages and losses which the deposited
things suffer by his malice or negligence, and also for those [de-
teriorations, damages and losses] which arise out of the nature
or vice of the things, if in these cases he did not do what was
necessary to avoid or remedy it, giving notice of them moreover
to the depositor, immediately when they manifest themselves. 19
The Commercial Code further states that general warehouse-
men, after the General Warehouse Laws and the Commercial Code
have been applied, are governed, ultimately, by the "rules of the
common law, which are applicable to all deposits."'"2 This "com-
mon law" is articulated in the Spanish Civil Code. Article 1.766 of
116. Id.
117. CoDIGO DE CoMmacio, arts. 193-98 (1973) (Spain).
118. Id., art. 310.
119. Id., art. 306.
120. Id., art. 310.
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the Civil Code states that Title 1 of Book 4, which consists of arti-
cles 1.088 through 1.253, regulates the depository's conduct in the
care of the deposited goods. Article 1.094 is probably the most suc-
cint comprehensive statement of the depository's duty: "to con-
serve it with the proper diligence of a good father of a family." '121
Article 1.183 of the Civil Code deals with the question of loss
of bailed goods:
[Wihen the thing has been lost in the possession of the debtor,
it shall be presumed that the loss occurred by his fault and not
by unavoidable accident (caso fortuito) except [where there is]
proof to the contrary, and without prejudice to that disposed in
article 1.096.12
Article 1.096 then states:
When that which must be delivered is a determined thing,
the creditor, independently of the right which is declared in arti-
cle 1.101, may compel the debtor to perform the delivery. If the
thing was indeterminate or generic, he may request the dis-
charge of the obligation at the debtor's expenses. If the obligee
has been found in default, or if he is bound to deliver the same
thing to two or more different persons, it shall be on his account
unavoidable accident [in the sense of risk of loss for accidents]
until the delivery is accomplished. 2'
Article 1.101 completes the trilogy of articles:
They shall remain subject to the indemnification of the
damages and injuries caused in the accomplishment of his [the
obligee's] obligations incurred by fraud, negligence or delay, and
those which in any manner contravene compliance with the
former.' 2
In sum, the warehouseman's liability in Spain requires that he
exercise the highest degree of care over the goods in his possession,
and there is a presumption that if those goods are lost the fault is
his, unless he proves that it resulted from an unavoidable accident
(caso fortuito). In addition, the warehouseman will be liable for
damage caused by his own fraud, negligence, and delay in perform-
121. C. RODRIGUEZ. CODIGO CivIL 282 (1982).
122. C. civ., art. 1.183 (1982) (Spain).
123. Id., art. 1.096.
124. Id., art. 1.101.
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ing the bailment contract.
IV. LATIN AMERICA
As might be suspected, the legislative attention devoted to the
rights and duties of warehousemen varies from country to country
in Latin America depending upon the degree of the development
of commerce. Chile enacted The Law About the General Ware-
houses of Deposit in 1932, and, in spite of its relative antiquity, it
presents a modern articulation of the law.12 5 The warehouse re-
ceipt, under this law is required to state "[the special insurance
which it guards against,"12 6 and "[t]he marks and other necessary
indications in order to determine the identity and the value of the
goods deposited, or else the marks which require the regulations, in
order to establish the characteristics and fix the value of these
same goods .... 2
In Chile, the "proprietor of the general warehouse of deposit
shall respond, in every case, for the veracity of the declarations
stamped on the documents which are referred to in article 4 [cer-
tificates of deposit and of pledge] and for the loss or deterioration
imputable to his fault, or of his employees or clerks." '28 The ware-
houseman, however, "shall not respond for the losses or deteriora-
tion occasioned by force majeure unavoidable accident (caso for-
tuito), or inherent vice (vicios propios) of the goods deposited."' 29
As noted above, the warehouseman is made liable "for the loss
or deterioration imputable to his fault, or of his employees or
clerks." (emphasis supplied). A subsequent section of the Code en-
larges the respondent superior concept and states that "[tihe
crimes which the employees or representatives of the general ware-
houses commit in the performance of obligations which grow out of
its capacity as such, shall equally affect the civil responsibility of
the proprietors."'' 8 This Chilean concept of imposing liability upon
the warehouseman for loss "imputable to his fault" is reminiscent
of Italian law."'
125. CODIO DE COMERCIO (1977) (Chile).
126. Id., at art. 3(6) (translation by the author).
127. Id., art. 3(7).
128. Id., art. 19.
129. Id.
130. Id., art. 21.
131. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
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Argentina, Chile's neighbor to the east, has not followed the
Chilean model of providing a separate law for warehouses, but,
rather it has subsumed the law under the concepts of "Deposit"
and "Power of Attorney and Consignments." The "Deposit" Title
is limited to the idea that the "depository from whom the thing
has been snatched by force, and who has been given money or
other equivalent in its place, is obliged to deliver to the depositor
that which has been received in exchange."' 8 This passage is pre-
ceded by a rule which states that the law of "Deposit" is also af-
fected by another title: "Of the Power of Attorney and of the Com-
missions and Consignments."' 33
The Title for "Powers of Attorney" and of the "Commissions
and Consignments" provides that the depositary is responsible for
the conservation of the goods "save in the case of unavoidable acci-
dent (caso fortuito) or of force majeure (fuerza mayor) or if the
deterioration results from the inherent, vice of the thing."' 13 4 Al-
though beyond the scope of this article, it is interesting to note
that in Argentina the depository:
[I]s responsible for the loss or embezzlement of metallic funds or
current money which he has in his power, . . . even when the
damage or loss arises from a case of unavoidable accident or vio-
lence, unless a pact has been made expressly to the contrary,
and save for the exceptions which grow out of special circum-
stances, whose appreciation remains free to the care and pru-
dence of the Courts.'86
The depository also has a duty to insure the goods at the re-
quest of the bailor. The warehouseman who fails to do so will be
liable provided he has received sufficient funds from the bailor to
pay for the premium."'
In 1970, Paraguay, another neighbor of Argentina, modernized
its warehouse law by enacting "Law No. 215, of General Ware-
houses of Deposit.' 3 7 Article 14 establishes the basic liability of
the warehouseman:
General warehouses of deposit shall be responsible for the con-
132. CODIGO DE COMERcIO, art. 578 (1981) (Argentina).
133. Id., art. 574.
134. Id., art. 274.
135. Id., art. 270.
136. Id., art. 273.
137. Text translated from CoDIoO DE ComEcio Y LEYES COMPLEmENTARIOs 302-13 (an-
notated by 0. Paciello, 2d ed. 1980).
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servation, custody and restitution of merchandise stored in their
warehouses, but in no case shall they be responsible for loss,
shrinkage or damage which was caused by force majeure or una-
voidable accident, nor for loss, damages, shrinkage or deteriora-
tion which originates from the self-same nature of the merchan-
dise, nor will they be responsible for the loss of profit which
shall occasion the loss, damage, shrinkage or damage of the mer-
chandise, their obligation remaining limited to restore equal
goods, when such case should occur [in the sense that if the
warehouse should be liable for his own fault, etc.,] in equal
quantity and quality of the deposited goods, or if the warehouse
should prefer it, the value for said goods which have been regis-
tered in his bookkeeping. 8
The risk concept is addressed in a subsequent article:
Merchandise and products received by the general warehouses
of deposit shall be insured against appropriate risks for each
type of deposited merchandise under floating policies or fixed
[policies] in one or various companies legally established in the
country. The amount of insurance shall be the value declared by
the depositor or estimated by the official of the warehouses, it
ought to be equal to that [amount] represented in the Certifi-
cate of Deposit and Warehouse receipt.' 9
The Paraguayan law does not contemplate that the depositor
is to be the assured, on the contrary:
The merchandise must be insured in the name of the General
Warehouses of Deposit, so that in case of loss, they shall receive
the indemnification owed by the insurer. 40
Article 16 also gives the individual holder of a warehouse re-
ceipt a cause of action against the insurance company, even though
the policy is in the name of the warehouse:
About the indemnification guaranteed by the Insurance Com-
pany, in case of loss, they shall exercise equal rights and privi-
leges: The General Warehouses of Deposit, the fiscal institu-
tions, the holders of Warehouse Receipts and Certificates of
Deposit."4
138. CODIGO DE COMERCI0, art. 14 (Paraguay).
139. Id., art. 15.




When the law requires insurance to cover virtually every risk
of loss, the question of the warehouseman's liability then becomes
moot as to the bailor, although not moot as to the subrogation
rights (if any) of the insuror. Bolivian legislation handles, at least
part of the problem well:
(Value of the merchandise or products). General warehouses
shall issue certificates of deposit of the merchandise or products,
taking as a base the value declared by the bailor (depositante).
Only when a notorious discrepancy between said value and the
standard [value] is observed, shall they proceed to demand jusfi-
able documentation of such situation."'
The warehouse's duty, in response to this declared value, is:
(Insurance) .... to protect for possible losses, thefts, robberies
and other similar [things], as well as against fire, explosion and
other risks, to which are exposed the merchandise and products
deposited, when they are not directly insured by the
depositors.""
In Honduras, however, it appears that the warehouseman's ob-
ligation to procure insurance is optional."4 The optional approach
seems unusual in light of the fact that the warehouseman "must
take care of the thing with the most strict diligence," and because
the Mercantile Deposit section of the Commercial Code does not
expressly limit this duty by any notion of force majeure.'" In
neighboring El Salvador, the law requires that the certificate of de-
posit issued by the warehouseman state the amount of insurance
and the name of the insurance company,"'6 although either the
owner or the warehouse can obtain insurance.1 47
The Venezuelan law governing "Deposit"148 incorporates the
law governing "Commission Contracts" which, in turn, incorpo-
rates the law governing the transport of goods. Under the "Com-
mission Contract" the depository "responds for the deterioration
or of the loss of the thing consigned which it has in its power,
which does not originate from an unavoidable accident or of its
142. C. MORALES, CODIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 1.195 pp. 1170-79 (C.M. Guillen 1981)
(Translated by author).
143. Id., art. 1.196.
144. CoDIo DE COMFRCIO, art. 853, XI (1950) (Honduras).
145. Id., art. 844.
146. CODIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 844, X (1974) (EL Salvador).
147. Id., art. 857.
148. CODIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 534 (1982) (Venezuela).
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own defect of the very same thing, in the terms expressed in article
173. ' 149 Article 173, which is primarily addressed to the liability of
carriers, states:
The carrier is responsible for the losses and damages which the
objects suffer, or delay in their transportation, unless it is
proved that it has happened by an unavoidable accident or of
force majeure or by vice [defects] of the objects or by their na-
ture, or by act the shipper or of his consignee.15 0
The same section then attempts to define force majeure:
Cases of force majeure are, calamitous accidents which cannot
be foreseen and prevented by the prudence and the proper
means of men of the respective profession. But the carrier is
responsible:
1. If his act or fault has contributed to the advent of the
unavoidable accident.
2. If it has not employed all of the necessary diligence and
skill to stop or lessen the effects of the accident or damage.
3. If in the carriage, conveyance, or protection of the mer-
chandise the diligence and care used by intelligent and cautious
carriers has not been exercised [no hubiere puesto-literally
means- has not been put.] 6"
It seems strange that the Venezuelan law, after stressing the
liability of the warehouseman, fails to require insurance of the
goods; liability without insurance coverage may often be a vain
thing.
The Ecuadorian law of "Deposit" also incorporates by refer-
ence the law governing the "Commission Contract."'' 5 The law
governing "Commission Contracts" contains the same language as
that found in Venezuelan law with the exception of the additional
thought that "[t]he damage shall be calculated by the value of the
thing in the place and in the time in which it has happened." 158
This section of the Venezuelan Code then refers the reader to arti-
cle 221, which replicates the Venezuelan force majeure law dis-
149. Id., art. 384.
150. Id., art. 173.
151. Id.
152. CODIGO DE CObtRCIO, art. 568 (1982) (Ecuador).





In a time in the United States when the liability of manufac-
turers, sellers of goods, suppliers of professional services (medical,
legal, engineering, accountants), landlords, owners of real property,
et cetera, is showing an almost geometric increase, it would seem
that the warehouseman's capacity to limit his liability under the
guise of freedom of contract is an anachronism. If the law permits
this self-limitation of liability for one class of individuals, then the
law ought to permit it for all classes. Of course, the present devel-
opment of expanding liability will probably preclude any wide-
spread adoption of allowing all classes to limit their liability. On
the other hand, a modern trend in the law for carriers is to expand
their liability to shippers and consignees of goods, particularly on
the international level.15" It is suggested that this trend should be
extended to warehousemen, either by adopting the force majeure
or unavoidable accident approach found in many of the civilian
codes, or by eliminating the right of warehousemen to limit their
liability by inconspicuous (and usually unbargained for) limitation
of liability clauses. The developing case law in New York in myste-
rious disappearance cases may be a judicially inarticulate way of
engrafting an American version of a force majeure rule upon
warehousemen.
154. E.g., D.E. Murray, The Hamburg Rules: A Comparative Analysis, 12 LAW. AM. 59
(1980).
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